Last week, PRRI (Public Religion Research Institute) released its latest Census of American Religion, confirming some trends and revealing others in the religious landscape of the United States. Notably, secular individuals continue to represent a significant portion of the population, accounting for 28% of U.S. adults. While this figure shows no major change from the previous year, there have been some notable shifts in American secularism since the first iteration of the study in 2013.

Overall trend 2013-2025

When comparing the latest findings to those from over a decade ago, the nonreligious cohort has grown from 21% to 28%. In real numbers, the secular adult population increased from about 51 million in 2013 to 75 million in 2025 based on the size of the U.S. adult population at the time. That seven-percentage-point growth in 12 years translates to a 47% growth in real numbers. 

Young women are key to secularism’s growth

A closer look at age groups reveals consistent trends: the proportion of secular individuals among those under 30 has increased from 32% in 2013 to 39% in 2025. Though the media focuses on the supposed boom in Christianity among young men, women have a more interesting … and measurable trend. In 2013, 35% of men and 29% of women identified as nonreligious. Looking ahead to 2025, it appears that while men have maintained their level of secularism (35%), women have become less religious (43%), a nearly 50% increase. Young women are more secular than young men.

A core Democratic Party constituency

The political affiliations of the nonreligious also illustrate an evolving landscape. In 2013, only 22% of self-identified Democrats were nonreligious, while that number has risen to 34% in 2025. Conversely, Republican support remains limited, with just a slight increase in nonreligious identification among this group from 10% to 13% of Republicans identifying as nonreligious. 

Conclusion

The report is consistent with other surveys, finding that secularism is not in retreat. Though stories of young Christian men are dominating the news, it is in fact the declining religiosity of young women the only measurable religious trend among young people. In the next few weeks, I will be commenting on the findings of the PRRI Census of American Religion as it concerns the secular cohort. I will focus especially on the report’s political trends, as well as demographic aspects, including a deeper dive into race, gender, and sexuality. 

New York City

Zohran Mamdani won a majority of the vote in New York City, defeating former disgraced Governor Andrew Cuomo, a Democrat who ran as an independent after losing in the primary. Despite concerns about how a split Democratic vote might affect his chances, Mamdani not only secured victory but also garnered a significant majority. 

Exit polls indicated a considerable generational gap in New York City’s electorate, with young people under 45, particularly those under 30, overwhelmingly supporting Mamdani. Additionally, he saw increased support among voters of color, including Black, Latino, and Asian voters, compared to the primary.

NBC’s exit polling broke down the results by religion. According to their data, 23% of New York City voters identified as secular. Out of nearly 2 million votes cast, secular voters represented approximately 460,000 votes, or just under 100,000 fewer votes than Catholics (27%). The Catholic vote was the largest religion cohort.

Mamdani’s strongest base of support was secular voters, more than three-quarters (76%) of whom voted for the now mayor-elect. Approximately 350,000 of Mamdani’s 1 million votes came from secular voters. Considering how well Mamdani fared among young voters under 30 (78%), it is understandable that he showed such strength among secular voters. I assume it also didn’t hurt that being to the left of most Democrats (as a Democratic Socialist) was also a factor for his strong secular support, since secular people tend to be more liberal than Democrats overall. 

Mamdani’s share of the secular vote was more than three times that of Cuomo (35% vs. 11%). In a sign of a younger New York being behind his candidacy, one in five of his supporters (20%) were non-Christian or Jewish religious voters, likely stemming from Mamdani’s own Muslim faith. Only eight percent of Cuomo’s supporters came from religious communities other than Jewish and Christian. 

Christian and Jewish voters were more favorable toward Cuomo. One-third of Cuomo’s votes came from Catholics, nearly one-quarter (24%) from Jewish voters, and more than one in five (22%) from Protestant Christians.  Mamdani had similar shares of Catholics (18%) and Protestants (17%), while just one in ten was Jewish. 

Virginia/New Jersey

In New Jersey and Virginia, major news networks like CNN, NBC, and CBS have not broken down election results by religion. However, secular voters were among the strongest opponents of Trump in the 2024 race in those states (see the blog entries about secular voters in Virginia and New Jersey in 2024). The results in both states show stronger support for the Democratic candidates (Rep. Spanberger of Virginia and Rep. Mikie Sherill of New Jersey compared to former Vice President Harris last year.

We know that secular voters are among Trump’s strongest opponents. In recent elections, nearly 70% of non-religious voters in both Virginia and New Jersey supported Democratic options. Given the close alignment of the Republican candidates with Trump, it is reasonable to anticipate that these voters broke heavily in favor of the Democratic candidates once again. It wouldn’t be surprising if their support for the Democratic candidates neared 80% in 2025. Whether in Virginia, New Jersey, or New York City, secular voters have become an integral part of the Democratic coalition and are necessary for any Democratic success in the 2026 midterms. 

I want to continue with the discussion of the American Values Survey by PRRI. Last week, I mentioned that secular people are heavily invested in opposing Trump and his administration. On every question where a majority of the public disagrees with an action the administration has taken, secular people are at least 15 to 20 points more opposed. However, it is also true, as I noted, that even though secular people have a very negative view of the Republican Party overall, their opinion of the Democratic Party is not as high as the average person in the country. This poses a challenge electorally as we approach Election Day 2025 and the 2026 midterm elections.

The AVS asked questions about the generic ballot leading up to the November 2026 election and revealed that Democrats have a slight advantage in the generic ballot, 33 to 30 over Republicans. However, 20% of the population indicated they are unsure about their voting choice, and an additional 12% stated they will not vote. Today, I want to focus on these aspects of the 2026 election, especially since few generic ballot questions include breakdowns by religion as specific as those in the PRRI surveys.

I’m going to analyze four specific groups: independent voters (those who do not identify with the major political parties), secular or nonreligious people, Latino Catholics, and Latino Protestants. These groups may not overlap significantly, but they do share a propensity to be overrepresented among independent voters. 

In this case, independent voters prefer Democrats to Republicans by a two-to-one margin (30% to 15%). Yet, a significant portion (33%) remains undecided about who they will vote for in 2026, and an additional 11% say they will not participate in that election. Among the religious cohorts identified, many indicate they will not vote in 2026: 19% of Latino Protestants, and 15% of the nonreligious and Latino Catholics.

Historically, the latter two of these groups have leaned Democratic, and currently, secular individuals favor Democrats by a four-to-one margin (48% to 11%). Even with 20% of secular voters undecided, the plurality still leans toward Democrats. We expect that as the election approaches, many of these individuals will likely vote Democratic.

For Latino Catholics, the Democrats hold a 41% to 17% advantage, with 21% unsure of their voting choice. Even if these undecided individuals lean Republican, Democrats would still maintain a preference among this group. 

Latino Protestants have been swing voters but have shown a strong Republican turn since 2016. Currently, Republicans hold a decent 12-point advantage in the generic ballot, with 23% still undecided. If that percentage splits along recent lines, the Republican candidates are likely to secure a larger share of these ballots moving forward.

These groups have different reasons for their high number of potential non-voters and those unsure about their voting intentions. In the case of independents, they don’t have a strong attachment to political parties. I would bet that among those leaning toward a party, the 33% of undecideds will likely split along their leanings. The larger question is whether those without strong leanings will show up to vote, particularly in a midterm election.

The 20% of secular individuals who have yet to decide on their 2026 vote will be influenced mainly by their leanings and dislike of Trump, which may overshadow their apathy toward Democrats. Though 42% of secular people view the Democratic Party positively, we should remember that about 7 in 10 secular voters supported Harris in 2024. In other words, many secular people who voted for Harris in 2024 do not have a favorable view of the party in 2025. The AVA asked why people have a negative opinion of the parties, though the report did not break the results down by religious affiliation. Many Democrats who don’t like the party feel that their values are not represented. While some may be conservative, many, especially among the secular group, are liberals or liberal-leaning individuals who don’t believe the party is progressive enough.

The situation with Latino Catholics reveals an important dynamic in American politics. Historically, Latino Catholics have leaned heavily Democratic in elections, at least before 2024. This is a group that is very misunderstood, as it is generally quite progressive on cultural issues such as same-sex marriage, environmental issues like climate change, immigration, and economic justice. My dissertation research indicated that many Latinos, especially Latino Catholics, felt (and feel) that the Democratic Party takes them for granted. This sentiment may explain why Latino turnout was down in 2024. 

On the other hand, Latino Protestants, in contrast to Latino Catholics, have become solidly Republican over time. While there may be various reasons for this shift, a significant subset of Latino Protestants still maintains ties to immigrant communities: many are immigrants themselves or serve in ministries that cater to immigrant constituencies. Immigration may be the reason Latino Protestants have the highest rates of not voting/undecided in 2026. They may be socially conservative, and even economically conservative, but the AVA shows that this group has aggregate positive views on immigration and is the strongest supporter among GOP-aligned constituencies of a path to citizenship.

For a successful midterm, Democrats need to find a way to break through among these constituencies. If they can articulate not just an anti-Trump stance but also present clear, relatable explanations of what Trump’s policies have wrought and how they resonate with people’s lived experiences, they could galvanize support from those currently sympathetic with the cause but disenchanted with the party. 

Earlier this week, PRRI released the latest American Values Survey. While the survey contains a lot of information, I want to focus on five specific items that demonstrate how the secular population in the United States is essentially the heart of the resistance against Donald Trump.

Disapproval of Trump

Secular adults are the most likely to disapprove of Trump. While a majority of adults in the United States disapprove of Trump (56%), no group disapproves of him as strongly as the secular cohort. More than three-quarters of secular adults (77%) disapprove of the job that Donald Trump is doing, while only about 22% approve of his presidency. Additionally, although only 35% of US adults have a favorable opinion of Vice President JD Vance, even fewer (17%) secular adults do.

Perception of Trump as a Dictator

A majority of US adults (56%) agree that Trump “is a dangerous dictator whose power

should be limited before he destroys American democracy.” However, among the secular population, three-quarters (75%) agree, including 62% who strongly agree with the statement.

Assault on Checks and Balances

Among US adults, a majority (54%) believe that the Trump administration’s “changes to the federal government represent an ‘assault’ on constitutional checks and balances.” For secular adults, this figure rises to 71%. Just over one-quarter (27%) of secular adults say that Trump’s dismantling of the federal government “is a long-overdue correction of disastrous policies pushed by elites at the expense of ordinary Americans.”

Supreme Court’s Abdication

A majority of adults (55%) consider that the Supreme Court “has been too willing to let President

Trump expand his power.” Among secular adults, this concern is even greater, with 71% agreeing that the Supreme Court has granted Trump excessive power.

Opinions of Political Parties

Overall, the Republican Party has a slight advantage over the Democratic Party in favorability among adults, with about 39% having a favorable opinion of the Republican Party, compared to just over one-third (35%) for the Democratic Party. Not surprisingly, among secular adults, fewer than one in five (19%) have a favorable opinion of the Republican Party. However, even though secular adults express the most disapproval with Trump and his administration, only 42% have a favorable view of the Democratic Party, just slightly higher than the general population.

Final Thoughts

It is clear that secular people in the United States are unhappy with the state of the country and the direction the Trump regime has taken since January. They do not like Trump personally, do not like what he is doing, and do not like his enablers. Yet, while their opinion of the Democratic Party is higher than most US adults, it is not as high compared to how much lower secular people’s opinion of Trump and the GOP is. 

PRRI does not break down the reasons people give for having unfavorable views of the party by religious affiliation. However, knowing what we know about secular people from this survey (they do not like Trump and his actions) and their overall politics (very progressive), I would not be surprised that they heavily lean toward “is not progressive enough,” “does not represent the interests and values of people like me,” and “is not fighting hard enough against President Trump.” These were the most common responses given by Democrats who have an unfavorable opinion of the Democratic Party. 

Among secular adults in Virginia, half (50%) are women, while 47% are men. Nearly one in four are under the age of 30, and about 14% are over the age of 65. Furthermore, the racial composition of secular voters reveals that four-fifths are white, while one in five are people of color.

Of the  4.51 million ballots cast in the 2024 Presidential Election, about 22%, or nearly one million, came from secular voters based on the AP/NORC VoteCast. Kamala Harris, the Democratic Party candidate, won the state’s Electoral College votes with the support of three-quarters (75%) of secular voters, compared with 23% who backed Donald Trump. Nearly seven in ten men and more than seven in ten women, as well as adults under and over 40, regardless of race, secular voters supported Harris in Virginia. Secular voters accounted for three out of every ten votes cast for Harris and just over one out of ten votes for Trump in the 2024 race.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; Pew Research Center, 2023-24 Religious Landscape Survey; 2024 AP/NORC VoteCast

A slight majority (52%) of secular adults in New Jersey are women, while 46% are men. One in five of secular New Jersey residents is under the age of 30, while less than 20% are over 65. Three-quarters of New Jersey secular adults are white, while 25% belong to various communities of color.

During the 2024 presidential election, New Jersey saw approximately 4.27 million voters casting their ballots. According to data from the AP/NORC VoteCast, about 22% (nearly one million) of the state’s voters identified as secular. 

Democratic Party candidate Kamala Harris won New Jersey’s Electoral College votes against Donald Trump. A major factor in her success was the support of secular voters. A striking 72% of secular voters sided with Harris, while only 26% voted for Trump. This overwhelming support included more than seven in ten men, women, adults both under and over 40, as well as both white secular individuals and secular people of color.

Despite accounting for one in five voters in the state, secular voters cast three out of every ten votes supporting Harris, but just over one out of ten of Trump’s.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; Pew Research Center, 2023-24 Religious Landscape Survey; 2024 AP/NORC VoteCast

In 1980, the incumbent Jimmy Carter, a Democrat running for reelection, received 41 percent of the secular vote. His opponent and the winner of that election, former California governor Ronald Reagan, received 36 percent of the secular vote. That five-percentage-point margin would be the closest a Republican presidential candidate would ever get to a Democrat among the secular. By 1984, the Republican share (for Ronald Reagan) had increased to 40 percent, while the Democratic share (for former Vice President Walter Mondale) was 59 percent in a year that Reagan won in a landslide. In 198,8 the Democratic candidate, Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, won a majority of the secular vote (62 percent) while the winner, Vice President George H.W. Bush, received 36 percent of the secular vote as the Republican candidate. This was the last time a Republican received at least one-third of the secular vote.

The 1980 election is also a major example of another characteristic of the secular vote, the high level of support for third-party and independent candidates. That year, John B. Anderson, a Republican congressman from Illinois, ran as an independent and received nearly 7 percent of the popular vote and 12 percent of the independent vote. In 1980, roughly one-quarter of secular people (23 percent) voted for third-party or independent candidates, including 16 percent who voted for Anderson.

The 1990s were stable for Democratic candidates, but can be considered the lowest point for Republican candidates in terms of support from the secular. The Democratic candidate in 1992, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, matched Dukakis’s performance four years earlier (62 percent). Four years later, 59 percent of secular voters voted for his reelection. On the Republican side, President George H.W. Bush received just 20 percent of the secular vote in his 1992 reelection bid, while former Kansas senator Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican candidate, fared slightly better with 23 percent. The decade closed with Vice President Al Gore earning 61 percent of the secular vote as the 2000 Democratic candidate, matching the performance of his predecessor. The 2000 Republican candidate, Texas Governor George W. Bush, improved on his father’s 1988 performance and received 30 percent of the secular vote in winning the presidency.

Once again, secular supporters backed independent bids in large numbers in the 1990s. In 1992, businessman H. Ross Perot shocked the political world when he received 19 percent of the popular vote. The secular were part of that overall trend, with 18 percent voting for him. In 1996, when Perot ran again and received 8 percent of the vote, 13 percent of secular voters cast their ballots for him. Overall, 18 percent of secular voters supported third-party and independent candidates in 1996. In 2000, 7 percent of secular voters supported Green Party candidate Ralph Nader, who received 3 percent of the popular vote. Nine percent of secular people voted for candidates outside of the two major parties.

In the six elections in this century, all the Democratic candidates have received at least 65% of the secular vote. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry received 68 percent of the secular vote in 2004. Three-quarters (75 percent) of secular people supported Illinois Senator Barack Obama in his 2008 presidential bid. Support from secular voters declined slightly but consistently over the subsequent three cycles, with 70 percent supporting Obama in 2012, two-thirds (67 percent) supporting former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2016, and 65% favoring former Vice President Joe Biden in 2020. Biden’s total was the lowest in the century and the lowest since Al Gore’s 61% in the 2000 election, which included high support for Ralph Nader among secular voters.

For Republicans, 2004 was a high mark; 31 percent of secular voters supported President George W. Bush for reelection, the highest since Reagan received 40 percent twenty years earlier, a figure only matched by Donald Trump’s 31 percent in his first reelection bid in 2020. Between 2004 and 2020, Republican candidates have struggled to get 30 percent of the secular vote. Arizona senator John McCain received 23 percent in 2008, former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney received 26 percent, while Donald Trump received one-quarter of the secular vote in 2016. In 2024, Trump received 26%, in line with the secular GOP vote this century.

Except in 2016, twenty-first-century elections have lacked the high-profile third-party and independent candidate bids of the 1990s, and most secular voters have voted for candidates from the two major parties. In 2016, 6 percent of Americans voted for an array of third-party and independent candidates, including former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson of the Libertarian Party, physician Jill Stein of the Green Party, and former intelligence officer Evan McMullin. Eight percent of secular voters voted for these and other candidates, the highest level of support for third-party candidates since 2000. Without high-profile non-major party candidates, few secular voters cast their vote for other candidates in 2020 and 2024.

“Nones” was popularized by survey questions in which nonreligious participants could choose either from a list of faiths, or opt for “none of the above.” 

The “none of the above” question is emblematic of the broader problem we seek to solve—the religious lens applied to research on secular people gets in the way of asking the right questions, and using the right language, which would actually lead us to better understanding the complexity of this demographic. There is still a lot more we don’t know, and would like to find out through research led by and for secular people. 

As you’ll learn from The Secular Vote, the nones are diverse in many ways, including in beliefs. But you would be hard-pressed to find a secular person who describes themselves as a none. 

That said, you will find people who describe themselves as “secular” and “nonreligious,” our preferred terms for this demographic that we use interchangeably throughout The Secular Vote.

And while even these words are imperfect in their own ways, they are the best and most authentic umbrella terms we have for other words like atheists, humanists, agnostics, “spiritual but not religious,” and other religiously unaffiliated people. You can find a handy glossary of secular terms on page four of the Secular Coalition for America’s Journalist Toolkit here.

It’s important to note that the word “secular” changes its meaning when describing people, as opposed to ideas (like “secular democracy” and “secular governance”) or institutions that are religiously neutral (like school and libraries). When we describe people as secular, we are referring to their theological beliefs, not their beliefs about politics or government. 

It’s also important to note that not everyone who describes themselves as nonreligious are nontheists/nonbelievers—people who do not believe in god(s). Many Americans hold spiritual or religious beliefs, some of whom practice and some of whom do not. What secular believers and secular  nonbelievers have in common is that their distance from the institutions of organized religion is enough to comfortably describe themselves as nonreligious. In fact, they are skeptical of institutions in general. 

Of course, umbrella terms like secular and nonreligious are shorthand for a very diverse, complex and incredibly large group of people who represent over 94 million Americans. The Secular Vote is dedicated to helping you understand them. Check out our fact sheets and topline infographics to learn more. 

Over the last few weeks, we have had new developments in the field of religion and government. It comes as no surprise that the IRS has determined that it won’t be investigating preachers who endorse candidates from the pulpit. 

These actions are supposed to be the rebirth of Christianity in the United States, which has consistently declined over the years. At this point, some states have a secular plurality, and among younger people, secularity is very common. It has been a long-held goal for the Christian Right to use the tools of the state to impose their beliefs. Not just in a subtle way, as it has always been enforced by civil religion or societal norms that default to Christianity, but actually using the coercive power of the state. If there were a wall separating religion from government, these individuals want to destroy it completely, and it seems that they are achieving that at this point.

However, they haven’t really addressed the issues of the wall built between religion and the people. In my opinion, this will lead to the failure of their plan. We have seen for decades how the Christian Right has been trying to impose their beliefs onto people, and not coincidentally, the affiliation with Christianity in the country has declined. A country that was nearly 90% Christian at some point and had a small secular contingent just 35 years ago has now become one where about 60% are Christians and 30% are non-religious. We could attribute this decline to various factors, one being the political activity of the Christian Right, alongside its hypocrisy in terms of morals, which has fueled the growth of secularism in the country.

Many in the media highlight that most of the people who are non-religious in this country are not atheists or agnostics. Here is the hard, cold truth: most of the people who have left religion are former Christians. They no longer identify as Christian, aren’t moving toward more progressive forms of Christianity, and many have even left more progressive forms of Christianity without thinking about coming back. Moreover, as I have noted in this newsletter before, the proportion of secular people in the United States who identify as atheist or agnostic has continued to increase over time, including the proportion of secular people who do not believe in God but do not call themselves atheists or agnostics.

So what I’m suggesting here is that even though the secular boom of the last two decades may be plateauing, we could be moving toward a new era of secularization. I am aware that the low-hanging fruit has already been taken; most people who were nominally religious and have left their religious affiliations are not going back to religion, and there aren’t necessarily many of those people left. In fact, we may have a stronger polarization in which the people who remain in churches are actually more conservative than previous generations, because those who were less likely to practice and just kept the cultural and identity parts of religion have left. However, most people are not interested in having religion pushed upon them, and so what we may see is a new type of secular boom.

Let me explain myself. Most people are not particularly activist in their secularism. They don’t belong to organizations that are atheist or humanist. Most secular adults in the U.S. are essentially “apatheists” who don’t care about religion. They’re not necessarily atheists or agnostics, but they really don’t think about God. They don’t practice any kind of prayer or spiritual practices, despite claims of spiritual release, which remains vague. 

Even though organizations, along with media outlets, love to shout about how Americans may not be religious but still believe in some kind of spirituality, this is not the reality. Instead, this new secular boom may manifest in two ways: we could be seeing the birth of a more active secularism as a rejection of the proselytizing efforts from religious groups and we could see a new exodus from people who practice religion, disgusted by the remaining pastors who were hesistant of endorsing candidates and now feel liberated to do so. 

Public opinion on this issue is not particularly robust, but we have some consistent evidence. For example, a PRRI survey from 2023 found that overall, only one in five U.S. adults were in favor of churches and places of worship endorsing political candidates while retaining their tax-exempt status. Support was highest among white evangelical Protestants, with 36% in favor. 

The people who were the most opposed to it are the non-religious, with only 8% in favor of the endorsement of candidates by churches. 

In 2022, the Pew Research Center asked a similar question, and more than three-quarters of respondents said that churches and other houses of worship should not come out in favor of one candidate over another. Again, the most likely to say they should not come in favor were the non-religious, with 87% opposed, which is 10% higher than the overall U.S. population. The most likely to support endorsements were white evangelicals at 36%. The same survey revealed that only 31% of adults believe churches express their views on day-to-day social and political issues. Finally, the 2023 Pew Research Center’s Religious Landscape Survey found that a majority of adults agree that churches are too involved in politics. These four data points suggest that most people in this country are not interested in hearing more from churches when it comes to politics.

For the most part, even those who are religious aren’t interested in hearing political messages from the pulpit. This makes me think that the attempts to push religion from various angles, especially by this Christian nationalist administration, might backfire. While we may not see an outright explosion of people moving away from religion, it’s possible that the plateau of secularism could last longer, and we might even witness an increase in secular activism in this country.

Question wording:

1. During political elections, should churches and other houses of worship come out in favor of one candidate over another? (Pew, 2022)
   1. Yes, should do this
   2. No, should not do this
2. In your opinion, should churches and other houses of worship… (Pew, 2022)
   1. Keep out of political matters
   2. Express their views on day-to-day social and political questions
3. How much do you favor or oppose…Allowing churches and places of worship to endorse political candidates while retaining their tax-exempt status (PRRI. 2023)
4. On a different subject, do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about churches and other religious organizations? Churches and other religious organizations…Are too involved with politics

Last week, we learned that a majority of people in the U.S. support prayer in schools, particularly teacher-led prayers that refer to a generic God, rather than a specific religion (56%). A smaller majority (52%) also prefers prayers specific to Jesus. This trend is largely influenced by the attitudes of those who are non-religious and individuals from religious backgrounds that are not Christian. These groups overwhelmingly oppose Jesus-specific prayers. Interestingly, the levels of opposition to Jesus-specific prayers among non-religious individuals and Christians are quite similar. However, non-Christians, particularly religious ones, tend to be slightly more in favor of generic prayers than secular individuals.

When we examine Christians more closely, we find significant differences. For instance, while 71% of Christians support Jesus-specific prayers, this support is primarily driven by Protestants, about three-quarters of whom favor such prayers. Since more than six in ten U.S. adults identify as Christian, their preferences are skewing the numbers. 

Although Christians overall prefer Jesus-specific prayers, the favorability for generic prayers often comes from those who do not belong to major Protestant denominations. For example, 63% of Catholics support Jesus-specific prayers, while 70% favor generic prayers. Like Catholics, members of other Christian traditions, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Latter-day Saints, are also more likely to support generic prayers over those specifically addressing Jesus, with numbers showing 63% in favor of generic prayers compared to 56% for Jesus-specific ones. Meanwhile, non-religious individuals and non-Christians overwhelmingly oppose teacher-led prayer in schools.

Significant variations exist in the support for Jesus-specific prayers, particularly among different Protestant denominations. Evangelical Protestants are the primary drivers of this support, with 84% favoring such prayers, though this figure is slightly lower in historically Black churches within the evangelical tradition. Overall, 75% of Protestants support prayers in schools that mention Jesus, compared to 63% of Catholics and 56% of other Christians. In contrast, only 57% of mainline Protestants support Jesus-led prayers.

Interestingly, while evangelical Christians show strong support for Jesus-specific prayers, they demonstrate the lowest level of support for generic prayers among Christian groups. Eighty percent of evangelicals support generic prayers, a figure that is slightly lower at 77% among historically Black churches. Mainline Protestants, in comparison, show a 57% support rate for generic prayers. Support for generic prayers is even lower among Catholics, other Christians, and secular populations. These differences largely stem from the distinct positions of evangelical Christians. Thus, the overall preference for teacher-led prayer in the U.S. is not merely a construct of Christian dominance, but rather the extreme preferences of the dominant Christian group.